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Abstract 
A premature death unexpectedly brings a life and a career to their end, leading to substantial welfare 
losses. We study the retirement decision in an economy with risky lifetime, and compare the laissez-
faire with egalitarian social optima. We consider two social objectives: (1) the maximin on expected 
lifetime welfare (ex ante), allowing for a compensation for unequal life expectancies; (2) the maximin 
on realized lifetime welfare (ex post), allowing for a compensation for unequal lifetimes. The latter 
optimum involves, in general, decreasing lifetime consumption profiles, as well as raising the 
retirement age, unlike the ex ante egalitarian optimum. This result is robust to the introduction of 
unequal life expectancies and unequal productivities. Hence, the postponement of the retirement age 
can, quite surprisingly, be defended on egalitarian grounds - although the conclusion is reversed when 
mortality strikes only after retirement. 
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1 Introduction
The continuous rise in life expectancy observed in industrialized economies in
the last two centuries hides a fundamental feature of human life. Despite major
advances in medical sciences, a human life remains a lottery, with a signicant
variance in longevity outcomes. This point is well illustrated by survival curves,
which give us the probabilities to reach all ages of life (based on the age-specic
mortality rates prevailing at the year under study). As shown by Figure 1 for
French males, provided mortality rates remain constant, more than 13 percent
of the cohort born in 2010 will die before having reached the o¢ cial retirement
age of 62 years.1 Moreover, about 20 percent will die before age 67.
Figure 1: Period survival curves: French males (1816 to 2010)
Average life expectancy statistics therefore hide this important uncertainty,
and the induced inequalities in longevity outcomes. Only 61 percent of French
males will reach the average life expectancy, equal to 78.04 years. The remaining
39 percent of the population will have a shorter life.
Those observations are not without consequences for optimal policy-making,
in particular when considering the design of optimal pension system. From a
policy perspective, the observed annual three-months increase in average life
expectancy has often been used to justify postponing the legal retirement age
in countries with Pay-as-You-Go pensions systems. Indeed, if individuals tend,
"on average", to live longer, and if the retirement age remains the same, the
sustainability of the pension system requires, under a constant fertility, either
to increase the pension contributions, or to reduce the replacement ratio.2
The problem is that such a reasoning relies on a "on average" way of looking
at things. In reality, there remain, as shown above, large longevity inequali-
1Sources: the Human Mortality Database (2013).
2On the potential gains from postponing the age at retirement, see Cremer and Pestieau
(2000, 2003).
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ties, and it is not at all clear that policy-makers should concentrate on average
outcomes. An obvious reason why more attention should be paid to longevity in-
equalities is that a signicant proportion of those inequalities are due to factors
on which individuals have no inuence at all, and, thus, are circumstances for
which agents can hardly be regarded as responsible.3 For instance, Christensen
et al (2006) claim that about one quarter to one third of longevity inequalities
within a cohort can be explained by di¤erences in genetic background.
Given that longevity inequalities are, to a signicant extent, independent
from individual behavior, there is a strong ethical support for a social security
system that does not penalize the short-lived. The goal of this paper is to
examine the design of the optimal retirement system in an economy with risky
lifetime, with a social objective that incorporates a concern for inequalities.
In the context of risk, there are two main ways of taking account of in-
equalities. One can rst focus on inequalities in expected lifetime utility, and
in particular give priority to people having lower life expectancy. This connects
well to the policy proposal of making retirement age depend on working con-
ditions which a¤ect longevity. But one can also look at the nal distribution
of longevity and realized utility across individuals, and thereby take account
of the residual inequalities due to good or bad luck in the lottery of longevity.
This relates to the policy discussions about giving less priority to the (lucky)
elderly people who had their "fair innings". The former approach we call ex
ante egalitarianism, and the latter ex post egalitarianism.
Here is a brief summary of our results. We rst study the retirement decision
in a two-period economy with identical agents and a risky lifetime. In such a
simple framework, the laissez-faire allocation coincides with the ex ante egali-
tarian social optimum, but not with the ex post egalitarian optimum because
of the remaining longevity inequalities. The latter optimum involves a declin-
ing consumption prole over the life cycle and a later retirement than in the
laissez-faire. We then introduce inequalities in life expectancy which make the
ex ante egalitarian approach depart from the laissez-faire, and show how the ex
ante and the ex post approaches still di¤er signicantly. We nally focus on the
result that the ex post approach implies a later retirement, and we show that
the opposite result can be obtained when mortality occurs mostly after retire-
ment. The reason is that when mortality occurs early, a late retirement helps
providing high consumption to the young, in order to help those among them
who will have a short life. In contrast, when death strikes after retirement, it
helps the short-lived to give them an early retirement. Finally, we study a more
general model with wage heterogeneity and tax redistribution, and conrm our
results, qualitatively, in this setting.
In sum, the present paper suggests that adopting an ex post egalitarian
social objective would lead to a strong reorganization of the lifecycle in terms of
consumption and labour. As such, the present study complements the existing
literature in several ways. First, it complements the existing positive literature
3See Fleurbaey (2008) on the distinction between circumstances and responsibility charac-
teristics.
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on optimal labour and retirement age (see Sheshinski 1978, Crawford and Lilien
1981, Kahn 1988), by applying a model of labour and retirement decisions in a
context of risky lifetime. Second, it also complements the normative literature
on (socially) optimal labour and retirement age (see Cremer et al 2004), which
relies on classical (Benthamite) utilitarianism, unlike the present, egalitarian
ethical framework.4 Third, it complements recent attempts to apply ex post
egalitarian social criteria to economies with risky lifetimes (see Fleurbaey et al
2011), but which did not consider labor and retirement decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
framework where individuals who are identical ex ante turn out to have unequal
longevity, and compares the laissez-faire with the social optimum under ex ante
and ex post egalitarianism. Section 3 introduces unequal life expectancies and
discusses several di¢ culties with the ex ante egalitarian approach. Section 4
studies the ex post approach under di¤erent assumptions about when mortality
strikes in the lifecycle. Section 5 introduces a more general model with double
heterogeneity: life expectancy and labour earnings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Identical individuals facing mortality risk
We consider a two-period model with risky lifetime. The population is a contin-
uum of agents, with a measure normalized to 1. Agents live either one period
or two periods. The old age (second period) is reached with a probability .
During the young age (rst period), agents supply their labour inelastically,
consume and save resources for the old age. At the old age, agents can still
work some subperiod, of length z, and are retired over the remaining subperiod
of length 1  z.
We assume that lifetime welfare takes a time-additive form, and that old-
age temporal welfare is additively separable in the utility of consumption and
the disutility of labour. Assuming that agents have preferences satisfying the
expected utility hypothesis, their preferences can be represented by:5
u(c) +  [u(d)  v(z)] ; (1)
where c and d denote rst- and second-period consumptions, z denotes the
retirement age, while u() is the temporal utility from consumption, whereas
v() denotes the disutility of old-age labour. As usual, u() satises u0() > 0
and u00() < 0, and v() satises v(0) = 0, v0() > 0 and v00() > 0. Let u (c0) = 0
for a given c0 > 0.
For analytical convenience, we assume that the labour market is perfectly
competitive. Workers are paid at a wage rate w, which is taken as given by
4Utilitarianism also prevails in optimal retirement age studies in a dynamic setting (see
Michel and Pestieau 2002, Crettez and Le Maitre 2002, Lacomba and Lagos 2005).
5As usual, the utility of death is normalized to 0. Moreover, we assume away pure time
preferences for the simplicity of presentation. Note that the survival probability acts as a kind
of "natural" discount factor.
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them. There also exists a perfect annuity market, with actuarially fair returns.
This amounts to assuming that consumption at the old age is:
d =
Rs

+ wz (2)
where R equals one plus the interest rate, while s denotes savings. For the sake
of presentation, we will, throughout this paper, assume that R equals 1.
2.1 Laissez-faire and ex ante egalitarianism
In this simple setting, the laissez-faire allocation involves no ex ante inequality,
and is therefore also the ex ante egalitarian optimum.
Agents choose their consumptions, savings and retirement age so as to max-
imize their expected lifetime welfare subject to their budget constraint:
max
c;d;z
u(c) +  [u (d)  v(z)]
s.t. c+ d = w(1 + z)
From the rst-order conditions, we obtain:
u0(c) = u0(d) (3)
c = w(1 + z)  d (4)
v0(z) = u0(d)w (5)
The laissez-faire involves a perfect smoothing of consumption across periods,
i.e. c = d, as well as a retirement age such that the marginal disutility of old-age
labour (LHS) equals the marginal welfare gain from working (RHS).
Let us provide the intuition for comparative statics with a few gures. To
study the impact of a change in , consider the following two equations, which
derive from (4) and (5) after substituting c for d
c = w
1 + z
1 + 
; (6)
v0(z) = u0(c)w: (7)
From equation (7) one can write consumption as c = f(z), with f 0(z) < 0 and
f 00(z) > 0. This gives a decreasing convex curve (see Figure 2) that is intersected
by the line of equation (6) with intercept w= (1 + ) and slope w= (1 + ).
When  increases (raising life expectancy), only the budget equation (6) is
a¤ected6 and this line goes down (its value at z = 1 remains unchanged, at w),
which implies that z goes up and c = d go down.
To study the impact of a change in w, consider the di¤erent system formed
by (6) and the following equation, which derives from (7) after substituting w
for its value in (6):
u0(c)c = v0(z)
1 + z
1 + 
: (8)
6This, however, depends on our assumption of perfect annuities. Otherwise life expectancy
would a¤ect the choice of labour directly.
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Figure 2: Impact of  on laissez-faire
This equation provides a vertical line when u(c) = ln c; a decreasing curve if
u is more concave than the logarithm, and an increasing curve when it is less
concave than the logarithm (see Figure 3). In the former case, an increase in w,
which raises the line of equation (6), triggers a decrease in z and an increase in
c = d; in the latter case, provided that the curve of equation (8) is steeper than
the line (6) at the intersection  this turns out to be always true an increase
in w triggers an increase in both z and c = d. When u(c) = ln c, z is una¤ected
by a change in w.
As explained in the introduction, this allocation may not be satisfactory
when it exhibits large welfare inequalities between the long-lived and the short-
lived individuals. The latters lifetime welfare Usl equals u(c), whereas the
formers lifetime welfare U ll equals 2u(c)   v (z). Long-lived agents are better
o¤ than short-lived agents if and only if:
u(d)  v(z) = u

w(1 + z)
1 + 

  v (z) > 0 (9)
that is, if the second period is worth being lived. We focus on this case here,
and ignore the opposite case of poor economies in which it is a calamity to live
in old age.
Let us briey examine how this inequality depends on the parameters. As
far as life expectancy is concerned, given that a rise in  reduces d and raises
z and, thus, v(z), it follows that lifetime welfare inequalities due to unequal
lifetimes are smaller in economies with a higher expectancy.7
7The intuition is that economies with higher life expectancy are characterized by more
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Figure 3: Impact of w on laissez-faire
When the e¤ect of productivity on retirement age is negative, or positive
but small enough, a rise in w increases lifetime welfare inequalities between
long-lived and short-lived.
The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 1  At the laissez-faire, we have:
c = d =
w(1 + z)
1 + 
v0(z) = u0(d)w
dz
dw
? 0 () RR(c) 7 1
dc
dw
=
dd
dw
> 0;
dz
d
> 0;
dc
d
=
dd
d
< 0;
where RR(c) =  u00(c)c=u0(c) is the degree of relative risk aversion.
 Long-lived agents enjoy a higher lifetime welfare than short-lived agents if
and only if
u

w(1 + z)
1 + 

  v (z) > 0:
labour and less consumption at the old age, so that a premature death is necessarily less
damaging there, in comparison with economies with worse survival conditions. This is, again,
inuenced by the perfect annuity assumption.
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Lifetime welfare inequalities between long-lived and short-lived are decreas-
ing in life expectancy; they increase with productivity if
1
1 + 

1  (1 + z) v
00 (z)
v0 (z)

< RR(c):
Proof. See the Appendix.
Finally, note that, if the retirement age were xed, i.e. z = z, then a rise
in productivity would raise lifetime welfare inequalities between short-lived and
long-lived, as this would increase consumption at the old age, and, hence, make
premature death more damageable ceteris paribus. The endogeneity of the re-
tirement decision prevents us from drawing such conclusions: agents may, under
a higher productivity, work more or less, depending on whether the substitution
e¤ect dominates the income e¤ect or not.
2.2 Ex post egalitarian rst-best optimum
Let us now characterize the ex post egalitarian social optimum of this economy.
Under this social objective, the social planners problem can be rewritten as:
max
c;d;z
min fu(c); u(c) + u(d)  v(z)g
s.t. c+ d = w(1 + z)
The objective function of that planning problem is continuous, but not dif-
ferentiable. However, we can rewrite that problem in a simpler form assuming
that the optimum features u(d) = v(z). This condition is necessary and su¢ -
cient to insure the equality of lifetime welfare across individuals, whatever their
longevity. Therefore, the social planners problem can be rewritten as maximiz-
ing c under the constraints
u(d) = v(z)
c+ d = w(1 + z):
This boils down to maximizing the quantity
c = w(1 + z)  u 1  v (z) :
This is a concave function because u 1  v is convex. The rst order condition
is
wu0
 
u 1  v (z) = v0 (z) ;
which is just (5) because u 1  v (z) = d.
We focus on the case of an interior solution. As the FOC is just (5), it
is easy to graphically compare the laissez-faire and the egalitarian optimum.
From wu0(d) = v0(z), one derives d = f(z), where, as in Figure 2, f(z) =
u0 1 (v0(z)=w), with f 0(z) < 0 and f 00(z) > 0. Moreover, c = w(1 + z) 
d can be represented in the (z; c) space as a concave function c = w(1 +
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z)   f(z) that is below the line c = w(1 + z) and has this line as an
asymptote (see Figure 4).8 The socially optimum levels of d and z are obtained
at the intersection of d = f(z) and the egalitarian constraint u(d) = v(z),
rewritten as d = u 1  v(z).9 Given that limz!0f(z) > limz!0u 1  v(z) and
limz!1f(z) < limz!1u 1  v(z), such an intersection always exists. Then, for
that level of z, we obtain, from c = w(1 + z)  f(z), the socially optimal
consumption c.
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Figure 4: Comparing laissez-faire and social optimum
The ex post egalitarian optimum can be compared with the laissez-faire
as follows. At the laissez-faire, the optimal level of z is characterized by the
intersection of the decreasing curve d = f(z) with the increasing concave curve
c = w(1 + z)   f(z). On the contrary, at the ex post egalitarian optimum,
the optimal level of z is determined by the intersection of d = f(z) with the
increasing convex curve d = u 1  v(z). The intersection between d = f(z)
with d = u 1  v(z) is, in general, on the south east of the intersection between
d = f(z) and c = w(1 + z)  f(z).10 Hence the retirement age at the ex post
egalitarian optimum exceeds its laissez-faire level, and that old-age consumption
is lower than at the laissez-faire, whereas young age consumption is higher than
at the laissez-faire. The following proposition species our results.
Proposition 2 Comparing the ex post egalitarian optimum () with the laissez-
faire, if u(d) > v(z) at the laissez-faire, then:
c > c = d > d; z > z:
8Observe that the curves of equations c = w(1 + z)   f(z), c = f(z), and c = w(1 +
z)=(1 + ) intersect at the same point.
9Note that, if z = 0, d = u 1 (0) = c0 > 0:
10Exceptions include very poor economies (see supra ).
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Proof. Both the laissez-faire and the egalitarian optimum satisfy
c = w(1 + z)  f(z)
d = f(z);
where f(z) = u0 1 (v0(z)=w). The rst expression is increasing in z whereas the
second is decreasing. Therefore, c > c and d < d if and only if z > z:
The laissez-faire, in addition, satises c = d; in contrast, the egalitarian
optimum has u(d) = v(z).
At the laissez-faire, one therefore has w(1 + z)  f(z) = f(z), i.e., f(z) =
w(1 + z)= (1 + ). At the egalitarian optimum, one has u(f(z)) = v(z), i.e.,
f(z) = u 1  v(z).
Under the assumption that u(d) > v(z) at the laissez-faire, then w(1 +
z)= (1 + ) > u 1  v(z), which implies that f(z) > u 1  v(z). As f is
decreasing and u 1  v is increasing, the equation f(z) = u 1  v(z) requires
z > z.
The proof actually shows an "if and only if" fact: if u(d) < v(z) at the laissez-
faire (a poor economy), then the inequalities are reversed, and the egalitarian
optimum transfers resources from the young to the old in order to make life
bearable in old age: c < c, d > d and z < z.
Hence, in the case of a­ uent economies, ex post egalitarianism involves
longer lifetime working periods. This somewhat counterintuitive result can be
explained as follows. From an ex post egalitarian perspective, the only thing
that matters is to maximize the welfare of the worst-o¤. In advanced economies
with a su¢ ciently large output, the worst-o¤ is, unambiguously, the short-lived.
Therefore, if one wants to minimize ex post welfare inequalities, all resources
need to be targeted towards the short-lived individuals. Given that those can
hardly be identied ex ante, nor compensated after their death, the only solution
is to allow young age consumption that is as large as possible. This is achieved
by making the surviving old work longer than at the laissez-faire.
This has some consequences when one thinks about the direction of intertem-
poral resource transfers, that is, the issue of positive or negative savings. The
laissez-faire is characterized by positive savings, since c = w(1+z)1+ < w for
; z < 1, leading to a transfer of resources from the young age of life towards
the old age. On the contrary, under the ex post egalitarian optimum, the direc-
tion of intertemporal resources transfers is the opposite: from old age towards
the young age. Indeed, from the budget constraint, we have:
c = w +  (wz   d)
The curve of equation d = wz is an increasing linear curve that lies above the
curve u(d) = v(z) at z = z if w is high enough, so that the factor (wz   d)
is then positive, which implies the occurrence of negative savings. Thus, the
ex post egalitarian optimum involves intertemporal transfers from the old age
towards the young age, in su¢ ciently productive economies.
If, for some reason (e.g., political constraints), intertemporal transfers from
the old age towards the young age are not possible, one can seek to obtain
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a constrained egalitarian optimum, which has c = w and d = wz. One can
show that z is then at an intermediate value between the laissez-faire and the
unconstrained optimum. Inequalities are then not fully eliminated and long-
lived agents are now better o¤ than the short-lived.
3 Unequal life expectancies
Not all human activities are characterized by the same mortality risks. Blanpain
(2011) shows that, in France (2000-2008), life expectancy at age 35 is equal to
40.9 years for a blue collar, against 47.2 years for an executive. In this light, it
makes sense to explore what our results become under unequal life expectancies.
For this purpose, we introduce two kinds of individuals, with unequal mor-
tality risks, in the two-period model:
 Type-H agents, who have a high life expectancy 1 + H ;
 Type-L agents, with a lower life expectancy 1 + L, with L < H .
For simplicity, we assume that there exists an equal proportion of type-H
agents and of type-L agents in the population (at the young age). We also
assume that there exist type-specic annuity markets for the two types of in-
dividuals. Hence type-i agents who survive to the old age benet from savings
returns equal to 1i .
3.1 Laissez-faire
In the laissez-faire, individuals of type i 2 fH;Lg face the following problem:
max
si;zi
u(w   si) + i

u

si
i
+ ziw

  v(zi)

The FOCs are:
u0(ci) = u0(di) (10)
v0(zi) = u0(di)w (11)
From Prop. 1, we directly deduce that:
cL = dL =
w(1 + zLL)
1 + L
> cH = dH =
w(1 + zHH)
1 + H
and that zL < zH .
Thus, type-L agents enjoy higher consumption at all periods and retire ear-
lier. Despite this, type-L agents may have a lower expected utility, due to their
greater mortality, i.e., it is possible to have
u(cH) + H [u (cH)  v(zH)] > u(cL) + L [u (cL)  v(zL)]
in spite of cH < cL and u (cH)  v(zH) < u (cL)  v(zL).
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Proposition 3 At the laissez-faire, if u(cH)   v(zH) > maxz2[zL;zH ] v0(z)(1  
z)= (1 + L), then
u(cH) + H [u (cH)  v(zH)] > u(cL) + L [u (cL)  v(zL)] :
Proof. Consider the comparative statics of Prop. 1. The expression u(c)  
v(z) is decreasing in . Therefore if u(cH)   v(zH) > maxz2[zL;zH ] v0(z)(1  
z)= (1 + L), one has u(c)  v(z) > v0(z)(1  z)= (1 + ) for all  2 [L; H ].
The expression u(c) +  [u (c)  v(z)] is increasing in  if
(1 + )u0(c)
dc
d
  v0(z) dz
d
+ u (c)  v(z) > 0:
Using wu0(c) = v0(z), one obtains
u0(c)

(1 + )
dc
d
  w dz
d

+ u (c)  v(z) > 0:
One has c = w(1 + z)= (1 + ). The expression in bracket is therefore equal to
(1 + )
dc
d
  w dz
d
= (1 + ) [ w(1 + z)
(1 + )
2 +
wz
1 + 
+
w
1 + 
dz
d
]  w dz
d
=   [w (1  z) = (1 + )] :
The result is obtained by using wu0(c) = v0(z) once again.
Observe that it is not su¢ cient to have u(c) v(z) > 0 to make it a benet to
have greater life expectancy. The reason is that with perfect annuities, the rate
of return on savings decreases, making the initial consumption-labour bundle
una¤ordable after an increase in . If we assumed that all agents faced the same
rate of return, then it would be easier to obtain inequalities in expected utility
to the benet of the agents with greater life expectancy.
3.2 Ex ante egalitarian optimum
A social planner whose aim is to maximize the minimum expected lifetime
welfare faces the following problem:
max
ci;di;zi
min fu(cH) + H [u (dH)  v(zH)] ; u(cL) + L [u (dL)  v(zL)]g
s.t.
X
i=H;L
[ci + idi] =
X
i=H;L
[w + wzi]
We can thus reformulate the social planners problem as follows:
max
ci;di;zi
 [u(cL) + L [u (dL)  v(zL)]] + (1  ) [u(cH) + H [u (dH)  v(zH)]]
s.t.
X
i=H;L
[w + iwzi] 
X
i=H;L
[ci + idi] = 0
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where  is set so as to ensure that we obtain:
[u(cL) + L [u (d

L)  v(zL)]] = u(cH) + H [u (dH)  v(zH)]
We obtain the following rst-order conditions:
u0(cL) = u
0(dL) =


(12)
u0(cH) = u
0(dH) =

1   (13)
v0(zL) = u
0(dL)w (14)
v0(zH) = u
0(dH)w (15)
Under the objective of maximizing the utility of the worst-o¤ agent, and
assuming that the type-L agent is the worst o¤, we have that  > 1 , so that
type-L consumptions are larger than the ones of a type-H agent.
We thus have consumption smoothing, but at di¤erent levels for the two
types of agents. Type-L agents enjoy higher consumption at the two periods.
Hence, from the last two FOCs, it follows also that type-H agents should also
work longer, and retire later than type-L agents, on the grounds of the equal-
ization of expected lifetime welfare.
Proposition 4 Under H > L, the ex ante egalitarian optimum involves:
cL = d

L > c

H = d

H
zL < z

H
Proof. The proof follows from the FOCs.
Thus, at the ex ante egalitarian optimum, individuals with lower survival
chances should consume more than individuals with high survival chances, and
retire earlier than these. Unequal consumption patterns and retirement ages are
indeed the only way to yield an equalization of expected lifetime welfare across
groups with unequal survival prospects.
Let us mention that, under asymmetric information, there would be a con-
ict between the ex ante egalitarian constraint and the incentive compatibility
constraint. Indeed, if the social planner cannot observe individual survival prob-
abilities, and proposes the rst-best contracts, type-H agents have an interest
in claiming to be type-L ones. Hence, under asymmetric information, one needs
to add an incentive constraint of the form,
u(cH) + H [u (dH)  v(zH)]  [u(cL) + H [u (dL)  v(zL)]]  0 (16)
to the rst-best problem so as to prevent mimicking from type-H agents. In equi-
librium, this constraint is binding and no contract f(cL; dL; zL) ; (cH ; dH ; zH)g
can satisfy both the incentive compatibility constraint (16) and the egalitar-
ian constraint. There is thus a conict between egalitarianism and incentive
compatibility.
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This analysis reveals two problems with ex ante egalitarianism.11 First,
equalizing expected lifetime welfare across groups with di¤erent life expectancies
may still leave large ex post welfare inequalities between long-lived and short-
lived individuals. Indeed the above allocation of resources only equalizes the
expected lifetime utility across groups, but there still remain large inequalities
within groups, as a consequence of unequal lifespans.
The second problem is perhaps less apparent, but no less deep. It is assumed
here that H , L are simultaneously the average survival rate in the two sub-
groups and the individual survival probability of each member of the group. In
real-life applications, this assumption never holds. The average life expectancy
of blue-collar workers is not the individual life expectancy of every blue-collar
worker. It is in fact deeply problematic for the ex ante egalitarian approach
to require dening individual life expectancies. First, individuals may not be
trusted to have the best estimate of their own life expectancy, because average
subjective life expectancy generally di¤ers from observed average life expectancy
(Brouwer and van Exel 2005). Second, the very notion of an individual life ex-
pectancy is problematic. In a deterministic world, individual life expectancy
and individual nal longevity coincide. The ex post approach, by focusing on
the distribution of actual longevities, may in fact be the best version of the ex
ante approach, because it relies on the true individual life expectancy, not on
subgroup average life expectancy. In a sense, the ex ante egalitarian approach
remains utilitarian at the subgroup level (individual expected utility being abu-
sively proxied by subgroup average utility). In welfare economics, individualistic
approaches are better. If inequality aversion is introduced, it should be at the
individual level, not at the subgroup level. Therefore, from now on we focus
mainly on the ex post approach.
3.3 Ex post egalitarian optimum
From an ex post perspective, the planners problem is:
max
ci;di;zi
min

U llH ; U
sl
H ; U
ll
L ; U
sl
L
	
s.t.
X
i=H;L
[ci + idi] =
X
i=H;L
[w + iziw]
We can rewrite the social planning program in a more convenient way, by
adding egalitarian constraints. Three egalitarian constraints are needed: two
constraints guaranteeing that long-lived and short-lived agents for a given type
are equally well:
u (dL)  v(zL) = u (dH)  v(zH) = 0;
and one additional constraint guaranteeing that individuals with some equal
longevity are equally well-o¤ across ex ante types: u(cH)   u(cL) = 0. The
latter implies cH = c

L = c
.
11Additional rationality arguments against ex ante egalitarianism (i.e., it violates statewise
dominance) can be found in Fleurbaey (2010).
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The budget constraint, supplemented with the egalitarian constraints, im-
plies
2c = w (2 + HzH + Lz

L )  Hu 1  v (zH )  Lu 1  v (zL ) :
Maximizing c under this constraint implies w =
 
u 1  v0 (zH ) =  u 1  v0 (zL ) :
Therefore, zH = z

L , hence d

H = d

L . The two subgroups have the same
consumption-labour bundle, independent of their survival rate:
c > dH = d

L
zH = z

L
We thus have an equal optimal age at retirement, as well as equal old-age
consumptions, which are inferior to rst-period consumption.12
To compare this with the laissez-faire, remember rst that the ex post egali-
tarian optimum z is obtained as the intersection of the f curve d = f(z) with
the egalitarian constraint d = u 1  v(z). This intersection determines di and
zi for the two types, which can then be substituted in the resource constraint,
to obtain rst-period consumptions, i.e., 2c = w(2 + Lz + Hz)  (L +
H)f(z
).
The laissez-faire equilibrium is represented as the intersection of the f curve
with the corresponding c curves, i.e. ci = w(1 + izi)   if(zi). Observe that
the previous curve for c is the average of these two curves.
From Proposition 2 it is clear that, if u(dH) > v(zH) (which implies u(dL) >
v(zL)), cL = c

H > cH , d

L = d

H < dH < dL, and z

L = z

H > zH > zL, but
the comparison between cL and cL (which is greater than cH) is ambiguous.
However, if one assumes that at the egalitarian optimum, wz > d, then
z is greater than the solution z+ to wz+ = f(z+): At z+, the two curves
c = w(1 + iz)   if(z) cross. When z > z+ > z, therefore, necessarily
c > cL; cH , as can be seen from Figure 5.
The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 5  The ex post egalitarian optimum involves:
cL = c

H > d

L = d

H
zL = z

H :
 In comparison to the laissez-faire, assuming that u(dH) > v(zH), we have:
cL = c

H > cH
dL = d

H < dH < dL
zL = z

H > zH > zL:
12As above (section 2.2), we focus here on the case of su¢ ciently rich economies. In very
poor economies, the optimal lifecycle consumption prole would be increasing rather than
decreasing, as the low productivity level would not allow for u(di)  v(zi)  0.
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Figure 5: Comparing laissez-faire and social optimum
 If, in addition, one assumes that wz > d, we have:
cL = c

H > cL > cH :
Proof. See above.
In sum, the introduction of unequal life expectancies does not a¤ect the ma-
jor features of the ex post egalitarian optimum. Note also that this allocation
is still implementable under asymmetric information, as the allocation is inde-
pendent of the survival probabilities. In comparison to the ex ante egalitarian
optimum, the ex post egalitarian optimum recommends more consumption at
the young age (except possibly for type L), and less consumption at the old age.
Moreover, the optimal retirement age is also later under the ex post egalitarian
optimum than under the ex ante egalitarian optimum. Thus, adopting an ex
post view leads to a deterioration of the living conditions of surviving type-L
agents, that is, of lucky, long-lived agents who faced initially a lower life ex-
pectancy, as well as a widening of consumption possibilities for type-H agents
at the young age, on the grounds of a possible premature death even within the
type-H group.
4 Egalitarianism and retirement age
The conclusion that egalitarian concerns require postponing retirement is driven
by the fact that the worse-o¤ are individuals who die before retiring. The most
one can do for them is to increase their consumption, and to this e¤ect it is ben-
ecial if the lucky long-lived work even more to provide for more consumption
resources to transfer to the young.
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This reasoning may not be very robust. It might be possible to improve
the lot of the disadvantaged by granting them early retirement. This section
explores variants of the model in which this opposite conclusion may arise.
The idea is to introduce three periods so that mortality may be described
as striking primarily before or after retirement. Let us now assume that agents
work in the rst and second periods, retire during the second period and then,
if still alive, enjoy their retirement in the third period. The probability to reach
period 2 is now denoted by 2, whereas the probability to reach the old age,
conditionally on survival to period 2, is denoted by 3.
4.1 Laissez-faire
At the laissez-faire, the individual problem is now:
max
s1;s2;z
u(w   s1) + 2

u

s1
2
+ zw   s2

  v (z)

+ 23u

s2
3

where s1, s2 denotes rst- and second-period savings. Assuming an interior
solution, the FOCs can be rewritten as:
u0(c) = u0(d) = u0(b) (17)
v0(z) = u0(d)w (18)
c = w(1 + 2z)  2d  23b (19)
where b is third-period consumption. We thus have a perfect consumption
smoothing across periods. Substituting in the budget constraint yields:
c = d = b =
w(1 + 2z)
1 + 2 + 23
One can thus represent the laissez-faire as the intersection, in the (z; c) space,
of the increasing line c = w1+2+23 +
w2
1+2+23
z with the decreasing curve
d = f(z) obtained from v0(z) = u0(d)w. A rise in productivity w pushes the d
curve up, and raises both the intercept and the slope of the c line. Hence, it
contributes to increase consumption, but has an e¤ect on retirement age that
depends the elasticity of u0, as in Prop. 1. A rise in 2 leaves the function
d = f(z) unchanged, but lowers the c line, implying a later retirement age, as
well as a lower consumption (see Figure 2  the only di¤erence here is that the
xed point of the c line when 2 changes occurs for z = 1+3 instead of z = 1).
Similarly, a rise in 3 leaves the function d = f(z) unchanged, and lowers the c
line, implying a higher z, as well as a lower consumption. Thus changes in 2
and 3 have qualitatively similar e¤ects on retirement age at the laissez-faire.
Regarding welfare inequalities, individuals who live the maximum length of
life are better o¤ than those who die after the second period if and only if:
u

w(1 + 2z)
1 + 2 + 23

> 0
17
Moreover, individuals who live only two periods are better o¤ than those
who live only one period if and only if:
u

w(1 + 2z)
1 + 2 + 23

  v(z) > 0
From this, it follows that, if agents who live only two periods are better-
o¤ than those who live only 1 period, agents living the maximum life will also
be better o¤ than those living the minimum life. When considering lifetime
welfare inequalities between agents with di¤erent longevity, it appears that a
rise in productivity, by raising consumption at all ages of life, raises the welfare
inequalities between those living three periods and those living only two periods.
A rise in 2, by implying a later retirement and a lower consumption, will
reduce welfare inequalities between those living only one period and the other
individuals, who enjoy longer lives. The same is true for a rise in 3.
Proposition 6  At the laissez-faire, we have:
c = d = b =
w(1 + 2z)
1 + 2 + 23
v0(z) = u0(d)w
dz
dw
7 0; dz
d2
> 0;
dz
d3
> 0
 Agents with the minimum longevity are the worst-o¤ if and only if
u

w(1 + 2z)
1 + 2 + 23

  v (z) > 0
 Lifetime welfare inequalities between agents living 3 periods and agents
living 1 period are increasing in w, but decreasing in 2 and 3.
Proof. See the Appendix.
4.2 Egalitarian rst-best optimum
Here again, we will not focus on the ex ante egalitarian optimum, which yields
the same allocation as the laissez-faire, and focus instead on the ex post welfare
of the worst-o¤ individual.
Note that, under 2 < 1, that egalitarian constraint includes two parts:
u(d)  v(z) = 0 and u(b) = 0
The rst part states that individuals living one more period are not better o¤
than those who die after period 1, whereas the second part states that individu-
als living two more periods are not better o¤ either. This implies that b = c0.
But we also need to set u(d)   v(z) = 0, so as to avoid inequalities between
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agents who live two periods and those who live only one. As in the previous
section with only two periods, the social planning problem can be written in a
simple form:
max
z
c = w (1 + 2z)  2u 1  v (z)  23c0:
As far as z is concerned, this boils down to maximizing w (1 + 2z)   2u 1 
v (z), a problem that has already been studied in Subsection 2.2. If 2 < 1, we
thus obtain a decreasing consumption prole over the lifecycle:13
c > d > b = c0:
But let us now examine the special case in which there is no premature death
during the career, so that 2 = 1. In that case, the egalitarian constraint is only
u(b) = 0, leading to b = c0. Hence the social planners problem becomes:
max
c;d;z
u(c) + u(d)  v(z) +  [w + zw   c  d  3c0]
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint of the
economy. Hence the FOCs are now:
u0(c) = u0(d) (20)
v0(z) = u0(d)w (21)
w + zw = c + d + 3c0 (22)
From which we now have:14
c = d > b = c0
Hence, in that case, there is perfect consumption smoothing during the active
life (1st and 2nd life-periods), which is akin to what happens in the laissez-faire.
But c = d are greater than at the laissez-faire (in a­ uent economies),
because they determine the well-being of the short-lived. Given the relationship
v0(z) = u0(d)w, a greater d implies a lower z: Therefore we now obtain
that optimal retirement occurs earlier than at the laissez-faire.
This result can be understood as follows. As death strikes only during re-
tirement, the goal is to enhance the well-being of the active and the young
pensioners. As e¢ ciency requires retirement to occur when working more has a
marginal disutility equal to the marginal utility of the consumption it pays, a
better situation for these people means that they have a lower marginal utility
of consumption, therefore should stop working before marginal disutility rises
13We leave aside the extreme case of very poor economies, where the low productivity
level would always make the long-lived worse o¤ than the short-lived, and where the ex post
egalitarian optimum would involve an increasing optimal consumption prole, contrary to
what prevails under non-poor economies.
14Once again, we assume here that the productivity level is su¢ ciently large, so as to allow
longer-lived agents to be better o¤ than shorter-lived agents (see above).
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too much. Their extra welfare (compared to the laissez-faire) is split between
extra consumption and extra leisure.
In sum, the extent to which the egalitarian optimum di¤ers from the laissez-
faire depends on the timing of premature deaths. If premature deaths occur
during the career, the retirement age should be postponed from an egalitarian
perspective. However, if death only arises at the end of the career, then the
retirement age should be advanced.
Proposition 7  Suppose that 2 < 1. Comparing the ex post egalitarian
optimum () with the laissez-faire, we have:
c > c; d < d; b < b; z > z
 Suppose that 2 = 1. Then, comparing the ex post egalitarian optimum
() with the laissez-faire, we have:
c > c; d > d; b < b; z < z
Proof. See above.
In any case, consumption at the young age is always too low at the laissez-
faire in comparison with the ex post egalitarian optimum. But the crucial di¤er-
ence lies in the treatment of individuals in the second part of their career. The
ex post egalitarian optimum recommends to reduce their consumption and to
postpone their retirement with respect to the laissez-faire when some premature
deaths occur during the active life, whereas it recommends the opposite when
death only occurs once the career is fully completed. Our advanced societies are
still very much concerned with the rst case, but, over time, may come closer
and closer to the second case, as illustrated on Figure 1 for French males.
4.3 Moderate egalitarianism
The above analysis reveals a tension between the interests of the very worse-o¤
who die at the end of the rst period, and for whom increasing consumption
(therefore postponing retirement) is benecial, and the slightly less disadvan-
taged who die one period later and would benet from earlier retirement.
Full egalitarianism focuses only on the very worse-o¤, but if one considered
a moderate form of egalitarianism, it may happen that the fate of the less
disadvantaged looms larger, for instance if they are su¢ ciently many while the
worse-o¤ are few. It is therefore worth exploring the possibility to obtain a
policy of early retirement even when mortality strikes at all periods, provided
that mortality in period 2 is small and that the degree of priority for the worse-
o¤ is moderate.
A moderate egalitarian social planner seeks to maximise the following social
welfare function, where G() is an increasing concave transform:
(1 2)G(u(c))+2 (1  3)G(u(c)+u(d) v(z))+23G(u(c)+u(d) v(z)+u(b))
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subject to the following resource constraint:
w (1 + 2z)  c+ 2d+ 23b
The rst order conditions of this problem are written as follows:
@$
@c
= [(1  2)G0(U1) + 2 (1  3)G0 (U2) + 23G0 (U3)]u0 (c)   = 0
@$
@d
= [(1  3)G0 (U2) + 3G0 (U3)]u0 (d)   = 0
@$
@b
= G0 (U3)u0 (b)   = 0
@$
@z
=   [(1  3)G0 (U2) + 3G0 (U3)] v0 (z) + w = 0
where Ut is the ex post utility of an agent living t = 1; 2; 3 periods of life:
U1 = u(c); U2 = u(c) + u(d)  v(z); U3 = u(c) + u(d)  v(z) + u(b).
The above FOCs do not allow us to draw unambiguous results about the form
of the moderate egalitarian optimum. In the following, we provide a numerical
example aimed at comparing the moderate egalitarian optimum with the full
egalitarian optimum. To do so, we use the following functional forms: u (c) =
ln(c), v(z) = 2z2 and G(u(x)) = u(x)
"
" . We also assume that w = 10 and
2 = 0:9 and 3 = 0:8. We make the parameter of inequality aversion " vary
between 1 and  30.15 The following table contrast the laissez-faire (Section 4.1)
with the full egalitarian optimum (Section 4.2) and the moderate egalitarian
optimum, under di¤erent degrees of inequality aversion.
LF Moderate Egalitarianism Full Egalit.
" 1 0.5 0.1 -0.5 -1 -2 -3 -10 -30
c 5.41 5.41 5.67 5.93 6.40 6.85 7.76 8.58 11.30 12.58 13.26
d 5.41 5.41 5.37 5.32 5.21 5.09 4.83 4.58 3.78 3.43 3.25
b 5.41 5.41 5.12 4.87 4.48 4.15 3.55 3.07 1.74 1.23 1.00
z 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.52 0.55 0.66 0.73 0.77
U1 1.69 1.69 1.73 1.78 1.86 1.92 2.05 2.15 2.42 2.53 2.59
U2 2.95 2.95 2.98 3.01 3.05 3.07 3.09 3.08 2.88 2.70 2.59
U3 4.63 4.63 4.62 4.59 4.55 4.49 4.35 4.20 3.43 2.91 2.59
Under full and moderate egalitarianism, rst-period consumption should be
increased with respect to the laissez-faire, whereas second- and third-period
consumptions should be decreased.16 However, the extent to which optimal and
laissez-faire levels di¤er depends on the degree of aversion toward inequality:
the di¤erence between rst-period and subsequent-periods consumption levels
is maximum under full egalitarianism, but decreases as " increases.
15Assuming " = 1 under moderate egalitarianism is equivalent to assuming a utilitarian
social planner maximising ex ante utilities.
16That result is in line with a previous study by Bommier et al (2011).
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Regarding the optimal retirement age, we also obtain that, under moderate
egalitarianism, the optimal z increases with the degree of inequality aversion.
To interpret those results, one can assume that each period lasts 25 years, with
the active life starting when the individual is aged 25. At the laissez-faire, the
age at retirement is equal to about 61.5 years. When " is remains high, the
optimal retirement age under moderate egalitarianism is close to the one at the
laissez-faire. For instance, the optimal age at retirement when " =  1 is equal
to about 62.5 years. The largest retirement age under moderate egalitarianism,
obtained under " =  30, is equal to 68.25 years. This remains below the
optimal retirement age under full egalitarianism, which is equal to 69.25 years.
The underlying intuition behind those higher retirement ages under a higher
inequality aversion is the following: making individuals work longer tends to
reduce the welfare di¤erentials between those who live a short life and those
who enjoy a longer life. Note, however, that the optimal retirement age remains,
even under full egalitarianism, limited, because of the high desutility of old-age
labour postulated in this numerical example.
Note also that, while inequalities in utilities between individuals living one,
two and three periods are maximum under the laissez-faire and utilitarianism,
those inequalities are reduced as inequality aversion increases. Under full egal-
itarianism, we nd, not surprisingly, that ex post utilities are equalized across
individuals having unequal realized longevity.
How would an improvement of survival conditions a¤ect the social optimum
under moderate and full egalitarianism? To answer that question, the following
table shows the laissez-faire, the moderate egalitarian optimum and the full
egalitarian optimum when 2 is as high as 0:99.
LF Moderate Egalitarianism Full Egalit.
" 1 0.5 0.1 -0.5 -1 -2 -3 -10 -30
c 5.28 5.28 5.36 5.43 5.56 5.68 6.01 6.43 9.63 12.16 13.59
d 5.28 5.28 5.33 5.36 5.41 5.45 5.47 5.43 4.46 3.65 3.25
b 5.28 5.28 5.07 4.90 4.62 4.38 3.91 3.47 1.90 1.25 1.00
z 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.56 0.68 0.77
U1 1.66 1.66 1.68 1.69 1.71 1.74 1.79 1.86 2.26 2.50 2.59
U2 2.88 2.88 2.91 2.94 2.98 3.01 3.08 3.13 3.13 2.86 2.59
U3 4.54 4.54 4.53 4.52 4.51 4.49 4.44 4.37 3.77 3.08 2.59
An interesting result concerns the optimal age at retirement. At the laissez-
faire, the age at retirement is now larger than under 2 = 0:9. However, under
full egalitarianism, the optimal age at retirement remains, under 2 = 0:99,
exactly the same as under 2 = 0:9, and equal to 0.77 (or, in usual units, 69.25
years). On the contrary, under moderate egalitarianism, the optimal retirement
age is, under 2 = 0:99, signicantly lower than under 2 = 0:9. Hence, while
an improvement in survival conditions makes individuals work longer at the
laissez-faire, the two kinds of egalitarian optima have very di¤erent implications
in terms of the optimal age at retirement.
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In sum, this non-exhaustive numerical illustration shows that moderate egal-
itarianism involves, depending on the degree of inequality aversion, a large span
of intermediate social optima - including di¤erent optimal retirement ages -
between two extreme situations: on the one hand, the laissez-faire (equivalent
here to the utilitarian optimum), and, on the other hand, the full egalitarian
optimum. Moreover, an improvement of survival conditions is shown to have
quite distinct e¤ects on the optimal age at retirement under the laissez-faire
and under the two egalitarian optima considered. While raising 2 leaves the
optimal age at retirement unchanged under full egalitarianism, this raises the re-
tirement age at the laissez-faire and reduces the retirement age under moderate
egalitarianism.
5 Unequal life expectancy and productivity
Whereas the previous sections relied on a unique source of heterogeneity ex
ante - unequal life expectancy -, let us conclude this study by studying the dou-
ble heterogeneity case, where both individual survival prospects and individual
productivities di¤er. For that purpose, we turn back to the baseline 2-period
model, but introduce four types of agents ex ante, who di¤er in their survival
type i 2 fH;Lg and in their productivity type j 2 fh; `g. We have:
H > L
wh > w`
Hence, there exist four distinct groups of agents ex ante: types Hh, H`, Lh and
L`. For simplicity, we assume that there exists an equal proportion of the four
types of agents in the population (at the young age).
5.1 Laissez-faire
As in the previous sections, there exists a perfect annuity market, which yields
a return on annuities, 1=i where the gross interest rate is R = 1. Individuals
of type fi; jg face, at the laissez-faire, the following problem:
max
sij ;zij
u(wj   sij) + i

u

sij
i
+ zijwj

  v(zij)

and the FOCs are:
u0(cij) = u0(dij) (23)
v0(zij) = u0(dij)wj (24)
As in the previous cases, consumption should be equalized across time so that
cij = dij =
wj(1 + ziji)
1 + i
:
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Using the results of Proposition 1, we obtain the following ranking
cLh = dLh > cHh = dHh
cL` = dL` > cH` = dH`
cLh = dLh > cL` = dL`
cHh = dHh > cH` = dH`
or equivalently
cLh > cHh ? cL` > cH`
The ranking of retirement ages follows that of Proposition 1 so that dzij=dwj 7 0
(depending on the value of RR(c))) and dzij=di > 0. Hence, it is not possible
to have a complete ranking of the retirement ages as a function of the di¤erent
sources of heterogeneity. Only it is possible to show that:
zHj > zLj 8j 2 fh; `g
Long-lived agents are better o¤ than short-lived ones if and only if:
u(dij)  v (zij) > 0
Using results from section 2.1 (and the conditions set in Proposition 1), we
obtain that welfare inequalities between long-lived and short-lived agents of the
same ex ante type ij are smaller for agents with higher life expectancy and
higher for agents with higher productivity under the condition on RR(c)) set in
Proposition 1. Putting together these results, we obtain that welfare inequalities
between short- and long-lived agents according to their types are as follows:
u(dLh)  v (zLh) > u(dHh)  v (zHh) 7 u(dL`)  v (zL`) > u(dH`)  v (zH`)
Agents with high productivity and low life expectancy face a higher welfare loss
if they die at the end of the rst period than, at the other extreme, agents with
low productivity and high life expectancy.
5.2 Perfect information
5.2.1 Ex ante egalitarian optimum
A social planner whose aim is to maximize the minimum expected lifetime
welfare faces the following problem:
max
cij ;dij ;zij
min fu(cij) + i [u (dij)  v(zij)]g
s.t.
X
i=H;L
X
j=h;`
[cij + idij ] =
X
i=H;L
X
j=h;`
wj [1 + izij ]
The problem can be formulated as follows:
max
cij ;dij ;zij
X
i=H;L
X
j=h;`

ij [u(cij) + i [u (dij)  v(zij)]]
+ [cij + idij   wj (1 + izij)]g
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where the ij represent the weights which ensure the equality in ex ante utilities
for all types fi; jg. Assuming that low productivity and low survival probability
agents are the worst-o¤ agents (as it would be the case with standard utilitari-
anism), the ranking of ij is such that:
L` > H` 7 Lh > Hh:
We obtain the following rst order conditions:
u0
 
cij

= u0
 
dij

=

ij
(25)
v0(zij) =
wj
ij
(26)
from which we obtain the following ranking:
cL` = d

L` > c

H` = d

H` 7 cLh = dLh > cHh = dHh
zL` < z

H` 7 zLh < zHh
This ranking reproduces what we had in the one-source of heterogeneity cases
and ensures the equalization of ex ante utilities across types.
For each type ij, consumption is smoothed across the lifecycle. The con-
sumption prole of agents with low life expectancy and low productivity (i.e.
type L`) is higher than the one of agents with high life expectancy and high
productivity (i.e. type Hh), whereas there is no clear ranking in terms of con-
sumption for the intermediate types (i.e. types H` and Lh). In their case, one
needs additional assumptions on the relative size of di¤erences in longevity and
productivity (i.e. whether inequalities are higher in one or the other dimension
of heterogeneity) in order to obtain a clear ranking of their consumptions.
Regarding the optimal retirement ages, we obtain that agents with low pro-
ductivity (i.e. type i`) should, ceteris paribus, retire earlier than agents with
high productivity (i.e. type ih). That result is standard in the literature. We
obtain also that agents with low life expectancy (i.e. type Lj) should, ceteris
paribus, retire earlier than agents with high life expectancy (i.e. type Hj).
That earlier retirement would be a kind of compensation for the lowest survival
prospects. Here again, there is no clear ranking when considering the opti-
mal retirement ages for the intermediate groups: low productivity / high life
expectancy, and high productivity / low life expectancy.
5.2.2 Ex post egalitarian optimum
In this section, we thus have eight types of agents, depending on whether they
are long-lived or short-lived. The planners problem is thus written as follows:
max
cij ;dij ;zij
min

Uslij ; U
ll
ij
	
s. t.
X
i=H;L
X
j=h;`
(cij + idij) =
X
i=H;L
X
j=h;`
wj (1 + izij)
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where as before, one has
Uslij = u(cij)
U llij = u(cij) + u (dij)  v(zij)
As in the preceding sections, we can rewrite this problem in a more convenient
way by expliciting the egalitarian constraints. First, short-lived and long-lived
of given types must be equally well:
u
 
dij
  v(zij ) = 0 8i; j (27)
Note that this corresponds to a case where one can have sij  0.17 Second,
short-lived agents have to be equally well:
u(cij ) = u 8i; j
The latter constraint implies that cij = c
 for every agent. Using the same
approach as in section 3.3, we have that
4c =
X
i=H;L
X
j=h;`
wj(1 + iz

ij )  iu 1  v(zij )
Maximising c with respect to zij yields:
wj =
 
u 1  v0 (zij ) (28)
and thus, that zLh = z

Hh > z

L` = z

H`. From (27) this implies that d

Lh =
dHh > d

L` = d

H`: That allocation is independent of survival rates. This is a
direct consequence of the ex post egalitarian approach, as what matters is the
realized outcome and not the expected one. Regarding the form of the lifecycle
consumption prole, and focusing on the case of su¢ ciently rich economies, we
obtain, as in the baseline model, that the optimal consumption prole is, in
general, decreasing over time for each type, so that c > dih ; d

i` . Finally, note
that ex post utilities are the same for short and long-lived agents and across
types. This is a direct consequence of the rst period consumption equalization
and of (27).
The following proposition summarizes our results under perfect information.
Proposition 8 Consider a two-period economy with risky lifetime, and inequal-
ities in terms of life expectancy (H > L) and productivity (wh > w`).
 The laissez-faire involves:
cij = dij 8i 2 fH;Lg ;8j 2 fh; `g
cLh > cHh ? cL` > cH`
dLh > dHh ? dL` > dH`
zHj > zLj 8j 2 fh; `g
17 If sij was constrained to be positive, one would have that second period utility would be
equal across types but not necessarly null.
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 The ex ante egalitarian optimum involves:
cij = d

ij 8i 2 fH;Lg ;8j 2 fh; `g
cL` > c

H` ? cLh > cHh
dL` > d

H` ? dLh > dHh
zL` < z

H` 7 zLh < zHh
 The ex post egalitarian optimum involves, if u (dij)   v (zij) > 0 for all
i; j at the laissez-faire:
cij = c
 > dij 8i 2 fH;Lg ;8j 2 fh; `g
dLh = d

Hh > d

L` = d

H`
zLh = z

Hh > z

L` = z

H`
Proof. See above.
The laissez-faire and the ex ante egalitarian social optimum exhibit a smoothed
consumption prole, unlike under the ex post egalitarian social optimum. The
main dissonance between the three allocations concerns the retirement age. At
the laissez-faire and at the ex ante egalitarian optimum, agents with a higher
life expectancy should retire later on, in comparison with agents with low life
expectancy. That result does not prevail under the ex post egalitarian optimum,
where agents with the same productivity level should retire at the same age,
independent of their life expectancy. Hence di¤erences in survival chances are
irrelevant under the ex post egalitarian optimum. The only relevant piece of
information is productivity: high productivity agents should retire later than
low productivity agents. That result was also prevailing under the ex ante egal-
itarian optimum. Therefore the main source of tension between ex ante and
ex post egalitarianisms remains the treatment of life expectancy di¤erentials,
exactly as in the model without wage heterogeneity (see section 3.3).
5.3 Asymmetric information
We now study the planners problem under asymmetric information. For that
purpose, we will proceed in two stages. In a rst stage, we will show that,
with both ex post or ex ante egalitarianism, under asymmetric information, the
equalization of utilities is not incentive compatible (as it was already shown
in Section 3.2). Whereas in the rst-best, the maximin criterion implies equal
utilities, in the second-best the self-selection constraint implies utilities that
are necessarily unequal. Then, in a second stage, we will derive the maximin
solution under asymmetric information.
To make our point, we assume a positive correlation between life expectancy
and productivity.18 That assumption is in line with the existing literature,
which suggests that there exists, in general, a positive correlation between labour
18We make this assumption so as to avoid unecessary complexication of the analysis when
studying the second-best optimum. Our argument could be extended to the four-type case.
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earnings and life expectancy (see Duleep 1986, Deaton and Paxton 1998). We
assume that type-H agents have better survival prospects as well as a higher
productivity, while it is the reverse for type-L agents.
5.3.1 Incentive constraints and egalitarianism
Under asymmetric information, if agents were proposed the rst-best alloca-
tions, type-H agents would always have interest in claiming to be L-type agents.
Hence, one needs to add to the previous problem the following incentive con-
straint:
u(cH) + H

u (dH)  v( yH
wH
)

 u(cL) + H

u (dL)  v( yL
wH
)

This constraint has to be binding in equilibrium. This is clearly not compatible
with the equality of ex ante utilities, that is
u(cH) + H

u (dH)  v( yH
wH
)

= u(cL) + L

u (dL)  v( yL
wL
)

:
The same problem arises with ex post egalitarianism. The only di¤erence
is that rst-period consumptions are the same across types, so as to ensure
that there is no inequality among agents who live for only one period. Saying
this di¤erently, mimicking is possible only in the second period. The incentive
constraint leads to setting:
u(c) + u (dH)  v( yH
wH
)  u(c) + u (dL)  v( yL
wH
)
which is binding in equilibrium. This is obviously not compatible with the
egalitarian constraint,
u(c) + u (dH)  v( yH
wH
) = u(c) + u (dL)  v( yL
wL
):
All in all, under asymmetric information, the egalitarian and the incentive
constraints cannot be satised at the same time. This result is independent of
whether we use an ex ante or an ex post approach.
In the following, we will thus use an alternative social welfare criterion, i.e.
the maximin criterion so as to solve the planners problem under asymmetric
information.
5.3.2 The maximin ex ante solution
Under asymmetric information, the ex ante maximin solution is obtained from
solving the following problem:
max
ci;di;yi
u(cL) + L

u (dL)  v( yL
wL
)

s. to
(
i (ci + idi)  iwi (1 + izi)
u(cH) + H
h
u (dH)  v( yHwH )
i
 u(cL) + H
h
u (dL)  v( yLwH )
i
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The rst-order conditions for this problem can be rearranged so as to obtain
the following marginal rates of substitution:
u0(cH)
u0(dH)
= 1 (29)
v0(yH=wH)
u0 (dH)
= wH (30)
u0(cL)
u0(dL)
=
1   HL
1   < 1 (31)
v0(yL=wL)
u0 (dL)
= wL
24 1   HL
1   HL wLwH
v0(yL=wH)
v0(yL=wL)
35 < wL (32)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the incentive constraint. First,
note that we obtain the usual result of no distortion at the top for the type-
H agent. For this agent, consumptions are equalized across periods and the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour is equal to his
productivity. In contrast, type-L agent consumptions should be decreasing over
time, i.e. cL > d

L and the retirement age should be distorted downwards. Under
asymmetric information, it is optimal to put an implicit tax on the retirement
age of type-L agents, so as to avoid mimicking from type-H agents.
Finally, note that we have the following ranking of utilities between the
short- and the long-lived:
u(cH) + H

u (dH)  v(
yH
wH
)

= u(cL) + H

u (dL)  v(
yL
wH
)

> u(cL) + L

u (dL)  v(
yL
wL
)

Clearly, at the second-best optimum, the type-H agent needs to have higher
utility than type-L agents, so as to avoid mimicking behavior.
5.3.3 The maximin ex post solution
Let us now turn to the ex post approach. As in the perfect information case,
we want to avoid inequalities in rst-period consumption, i.e., cH = c

L = c
,
to ensure that short-lived agents are equally well-o¤. Yet, as we showed before,
under asymmetric information, the equalization of utilities is not possible, since
incentive constraints lead to:
u (dH)  v( yH
wH
) = u (dL)  v( yL
wH
) > u (dL)  v( yL
wL
) = 0
where we got rid of the utility of rst-period consumption. The rst part of the
equality ensures that type-H will not be tempted to pretend to be a type-L,
while the second inequality ensures that the long-lived and short-lived of type
L are equally well o¤. Obviously, under asymmetric information, one cannot
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avoid that the long-lived H-type is better-o¤ than the rest of the population.
Because of the incentive problem, one has to leave him some rent. This being
said, the problem of the planner can be written as follows:
max
di;yi
2c = wH + wL + HyH + LyL   HdH   LdL
s.to

u(dH)  v( yHwH ) = u (dL)  v(
yL
wH
)
u (dL)  v( yLwL ) = 0
We assume that the social planner does not use the information revealed in the
previous period regarding wage levels, as otherwise the planner could observe
who is e¤ectively of type L or H.
Denoting by  and  the Lagrange multipliers associated with respectively
the incentive constraint and the egalitarian constraint, we obtain the following
marginal rates of substitution between the retirement ages and second-period
consumption:
v0(yH =wH)
u0 (dH )
= wH (33)
v0(yL =wL)
u0 (dL )
= wL
24   
   wLwH
v0(yL =wH)
v0(yL =wL)
35 < wL (34)
Hence the trade-o¤ between consumption and retirement is not distorted for
type-H agent (this is the usual result of no distortion at the top), but we nd
that it is distorted downwards for the type-L. Hence taxation of the retirement
age would be justied on equity grounds.19
Let us look at the ranking of second-period consumptions. Using the fact
that:
v0(yH =wH)
u0 (dH )
>
v0(yL =wL)
u0 (dL )
and the binding incentive constraint, one can show that the only possible solu-
tion is such that yH > y

L and d

H > d

L .
The following proposition summarizes our results at the second-best.
Proposition 9 Consider a two-period economy with risky lifetime, and inequal-
ities in terms of life expectancy (H > L) and productivity (wh > w`). Assume
asymmetric information about agents types ij, and a positive correlation between
life expectancy and productivity, implying two types H and L. We obtain:
 The equalization of expected or realized lifetime utilities across ex ante
types violates incentive compatibility constraints.
 Under the ex ante maximin, we have:
cH = d

H ; c

L > d

L
v0(zH) = wHu
0(dH); v
0(zL) < wLu
0(dL)
19See Gruber and Wise (1999) for reviewing evidence of the existence of an implicit tax on
retirement.
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 Under the ex post maximin, we have:
cH = c

L = c

dH > d

L , y

H > y

L
v0(zH ) = wHu
0(dH ); v
0(zL ) < wLu
0(dL )
Proof. See above.
The introduction of asymmetric information a¤ects the form of the ex ante
egalitarian optimum at three levels. First, the optimum now involves inequal-
ities in terms of the expected lifetime welfare between types H and L, since
equalizing expected lifetime welfare is incompatible with incentive constraints.
A higher expected lifetime welfare for type H is necessary to prevent type-H
agents from pretending to be of type L. Second, the optimal consumption pro-
le is no longer at for type-L agents, but is now decreasing, unlike at the
rst-best. Moreover, type-L agents optimal retirement age is here distorted
downwards. Making type-L agents consume less and retire earlier at the second-
period makes mimicking unappealing for type-H agents. Regarding the ex post
egalitarian optimum, the same incompatibility with incentive constraints holds,
and therefore inequalities in realized welfare remain at the optimum, between
type-H and type-L agents. Those inequalities are not related to the young age,
since rst-period consumptions are equalized across all agents. On the con-
trary, second-period consumptions are not equal, since type H enjoy a higher
consumption than type L. Here again, the age at retirement is distorted down-
wards for the type-L agent, in such a way as to make mimicking by type-H
unappealing.
Note, however, that, although asymmetric information makes both the equal-
ization of expected lifetime welfares and realized lifetime welfares across agents
incompatible with incentive constraints, the major di¤erence between the two
social optima remains: their di¤erent sensitivity to life expectancy di¤erentials.
Under the ex post planning problem, survival probabilities H and L matter
only through the economys resource constraint. On the contrary, under the ex
ante planning problem, survival probabilities a¤ect not only the resource con-
straint, but, also, how a given (cij ; dij ; zij) bundle turns out to be valued by
agents. As shown above, that di¤erent treatment of demographic information
is far from neutral for the design of the optimal age at retirement. That general
result remains valid under asymmetric information.
6 Concluding remarks
Despite major medical advances, human lives remain inherently risky. The
corollary of that uncertainty consists, in a laissez-faire world, in large inequalities
in lifetime welfare between those who enjoy a long life, and those who su¤er from
a premature death. Given that a signicant part of longevity inequalities are
due to factors on which individuals have no inuence at all, there is a strong
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ethical support for adopting an egalitarian social objective, which tries to reduce
welfare inequalities between short-lived and long-lived individuals.
Two egalitarian objectives were explored here. On the one hand, ex ante
egalitarianism, which recommends to maximize the minimum expected lifetime
welfare in the population. On the other hand, ex post egalitarianism, which
recommends to maximize the minimum realized lifetime welfare. Those two
social objectives were shown to provide quite di¤erent views of the optimal
organization of the lifecycle in terms of labour and retirement age.
Whereas the ex ante egalitarian optimum coincides with the laissez-faire
allocation in an economy of ex ante identical individuals, the ex post egalitarian
optimum recommends, in an advanced economy, higher consumption at the
young age, and lower consumption at the old age, as well as a later retirement.
Old-age labour thus appears to be a major ingredient of a fair production under
risky lifetime: the longer lives are, the longer the working period should be.
That result also holds in a more general economy with three life-periods,
provided some individuals turn out to die during their career. In that extended
framework, premature deaths during the career support the postponement of
retirement, and not an earlier retirement. On the contrary, the absence of early
deaths during the career tends to support the advancement of the retirement
age. Once heterogeneous life expectancies and productivities are introduced,
the ex ante and ex post egalitarian optima still di¤ers signicantly, whatever we
consider full information on agentscharacteristics or asymmetric information.
Hence, adopting an ex post egalitarian approach has sizeable e¤ects on the
design of the optimal lifecycle. Such an approach would have major corollaries
when thinking about the real world. To see this, consider, for instance, the
hardness of labour, which leads, through occupational diseases, to a lower life
expectancy. Such a lower life expectancy is often used to legitimate earlier re-
tirement for high-risk workers. This is in conformity with the ex ante egalitarian
optimum, but it is compatible with the ex post egalitarian optimum only if early
deaths occur only after retirement, or if the number of deaths before retirement
is small enough and the degree of egalitarianism is moderate.
The choice between ex ante and ex post egalitarianisms in a risky environ-
ment is a complex issue. There is no space here to provide a complete treatment
of that problem, which is examined in Fleurbaey (2010). Nonetheless, an egali-
tarianism that focuses on inequalities in life expectancies rather than in actual
longevities may miss its target. At the end of the day, what matters is what
people achieve, not what they expected to achieve. A person dying at the age,
let us say, of 45 years, su¤ers from a serious damage, even if he enjoyed a life
expectancy of 78 years. That damage would hardly be a¤ected if the life ex-
pectancy was, instead, equal to 77 years. Moreover, ex ante egalitarianism that
is based on average mortality statistics is not really ex ante egalitarian as it fails
to track individualstrue life expectancy. In a deterministic world, the true ex
ante perspective coincides with the ex post perspective.
In sum, life expectancy statistics, although most useful for various purposes,
can be quite misleading. That average gure hides the inequalities that really
matter: inequalities in the lifespan actually enjoyed. Policy-makers should def-
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initely not fall under the tyranny of life expectancy. But, as we showed in this
paper, adopting such an ex post egalitarian perspective would have substantial
implications for the organization of the lifecycle. Under risky lifetime and sub-
stantial mortality at working age, fairness in terms of realized well-being may
require the elderly to work more, not less.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The rst two equalities in the rst point of Proposition 1 follow immediately
from the FOCs. Regarding the e¤ects of w and  on z, c and d, assuming
di¤erentiability to the desired order, one obtains the following results. Fully
di¤erentiating
c = w
1 + z
1 + 
; (35)
v0(z) = u0(c)w: (36)
with respect to w and rearranging terms, one obtains:
dz
dw
=
u00 (c) c+ u0(c)
v00(z)  u00(c)w21+
=
u0(c)(1 RR(c))
v00(z)  u00(c)w21+
where RR(c) =  u00(c)c=u0(c) so that dz=dw  0 if RR(c)  1 and dz=dw < 0
if RR(c) > 1. We also obtain:
dc
dw
=
(1 + z)v00(z) + wu0(c)
(1 + )
h
v00(z)  u00(c)w21+
i > 0:
Fully di¤erentiating (35) and (2) with respect to  and rearranging terms, we
obtain:
dc
d
< 0 and
dz
d
> 0.
whenever z < 1, which is always the case here.
Inequalities in lifetime welfare increase with w if
u0 (c)
dc
dw
> v0 (z)
dz
dw
:
Substituting for the expressions of dc=dw and dz=dw above, we obtain that this
inequality holds if and only if
(1 + z)v00(z)
(1 + ) v0 (z)
+

(1 + )
> (1 RR(c))
from which we deduce the second part of Proposition 1.
34
8.2 Proof of Proposition 6
Fully di¤erentiating c with respect to w; one obtains
dc
dw
=
1 + 2z
1 + 2 (1 + 3)
+
w2
1 + 2 (1 + 3)
dz
dw
and di¤erentiating the FOC with respect to z; one has:
v00 (z)
dz
dw
= wu00 (d)
dc
dw
+ u0 (c)
Substituting one into the other and rearranging terms, we get:
dz
dw
=
wu00 (d) 1+2z1+2(1+3) + u
0 (c)
v00 (z)  w21+2(1+3)u00 (c)
7 0
Substituting into dc=dw; we obtain:
dc
dw
=
1
1 + 2 (1 + 3)
"
(1 + 2z) v
00 (z) + u0 (c)w2
v00 (z)  w221+2(1+3)u00 (c)
#
> 0:
Using the same reasoning for comparative statics with respect to 2 and 3; we
obtain
dz
d2
> 0 and
dd
d2
< 0
dz
d3
> 0 and
dd
d3
< 0
Di¤erentiating the expressions for welfare inequalities and using the above com-
parative statics, we obtain the last point of Proposition 4.
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